From turbulent diplomacy to transactional ties

Former U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell,

 during his visit to India, in January, 2002

    When respective Foreign and Defence portfolio holders of United States and India, concluded their latest round of bilateral meetings in New Delhi few days ago, an inference on reinforcing Indo-US ties strengthened. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar led the Indian delegation; Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin and Secretary of State Anthony Blinken represented the US. This was the fourth “2+2” India-US Ministerial Dialogue. The event was preceded by a virtual meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and US President Joe Biden. The spectrum for cooperation in defence, intelligence, cyber security, and national security to technology, agriculture, space research, education, and peace efforts has grown remarkably. Nevertheless, the greatest obstacle to deeper partnership is wishful thinking about what it can achieve.                

   A major roadblock in the path of Indo-US ties was an embowering of misunderstanding and communication gaps in the dialogues of both countries. Previously, US Presidents and senior administration officials have overlooked, deliberately or otherwise, matters of significant sensitivity to Indian rulers. That led to unnecessary misgivings, divergence of viewpoints and cratered perspectives, preventing fruitful diplomacy. The odyssey of Indo-US relations has a crucial determinant from the inaugural visit of India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, to the US in October, 1949.              

   When Nehru landed in America, he was feted generously by the then US President, Harry Truman. From conversations, mutual understanding of the two leaders’ viewpoints was achieved. Nevertheless, Americans were then obsessed with the bogey of Communism and the attendant threat from the then Soviet-led bloc. Nehru’s unique vision of “Non-Alignment” was not appreciated by the American establishment. Viewing events through the lens of “black and white”, they were inclined to believe that it gave unnecessary benefit of the doubt to the Communist bloc. That marked the beginning of an institutional groundwork of lingering mistrust interspersed by cooperation, assistance, and collaboration in Indo-US relations. Before Nehru left American territory, a reporter enquired of his viewpoint regarding the US. He replied that the US is undoubtedly a great country, but nobody should have to visit it for the first time.       

   That response bespoke a crucial implication: notwithstanding greatness and worthiness of several American attributes and systems, a lurking danger of miscommunication and misrepresentation of facts and figures could produce an outcome very different than required and aspired, when an outsider interacts for the first time with Americans. Pointedly, that essentially defined ties between US and India, till the mid ‘90s of the preceded century. Issues meriting separate look-ins got distressingly entangled. Indian policy of “Non-Alignment” was repeatedly cast as immoral by several American dispensations. That newly liberated countries of Africa and Asia needed a respite from being drawn into the rivalry then raging between US-led bloc and the erstwhile Soviet Russia-led combine, was less appreciated in the US than it was in former Soviet Russia.   

   After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the US enjoyed a pole position in the international system for nearly a decade. While India re-adjusted its economic policies towards a more open economy macroeconomic structure and prepared to embrace and advocate a gradually multi-polar power set-up, US relations with India showed signs of gradual warmth. The first watershed came through with President Bill Clinton’s visit to New Delhi in March, 2000. But, a major point of friction remained: the insistence that relations could not improve unless India gave up its nuclear weapons, first developed in the 1970s, in the face of opposition from Washington D.C.       

   The generation-changing moment came when George W. Bush became US President in 2001. He sought to accelerate cooperation with India in ways that would overcome existing disagreements and help both sides navigate the new century. In this, both countries sought to extend cooperation to stave off the ultimate mutual challenge looming on the horizon: China’s rise. Washington sought to maintain stability in Asia through an order based not on Chinese supremacy, but on security and autonomy for all states in the region. India, driven by its own apprehensions of Chinese domination, supported Washington’s vision over Beijing’s. Washington gradually set aside its demands against Indian nuclear proliferation as a means to help the latter build up its power against China. It helped lay the foundation of and an ultimate realization of the Indo-American civilian nuclear agreement, inaugurating cooperation with New Delhi on civilian nuclear energy without requiring it to give up its nuclear weapons.     

   With that as a benchmark, Indo-US cooperation has progressed exponentially. But, the relationship has to be charted with care and tact to prevent potential stumbling blocks to acquire dimensions out of all proportions than merited. India’s relations with certain countries, considered nemesis by the US, should not come in the way of a robust, realistic Indo-US partnership. India’s earnest, bona fide dialogues and transactions with Iran and Russia are often frowned upon by the US. That, as S Jaishankar and Rajnath Singh have made clear, in their own respective ways, cannot be determinants in Indo-American diplomacy.     

   The United States should desist under certain circumstances from levying demands on India that could threaten New Delhi’s relations with other partners. New Delhi, in its own way, must stop taking the United States’ strategic altruism for granted and assuming that it can rely on continued US generosity even in the absence of any attempts by New Delhi to make it worth the cost.   

   Indian Defence Minister, Rajnath Singh, addressing the Indian-American community in the beautiful American city of San Fransisco, spoke of India’s resoluteness of defending its sovereignty and interests at any cost. It ought to be another pointer that in bilateral diplomacy between US and India, the most pressing objective by far is not to wrangle around trade or Iran or Russia; it is coping effectively with Chinese belligerence in the coming decades.